Abstract. We formalize the security notions of non-malleability under selective opening attacks (NM-SO security) in two approaches: the indistinguishability-based approach and the simulationbased approach. We explore the relations between NM-SO security notions and the known selective opening security notions, and the relations between NM-SO security notions and the standard non-malleability notions.
In [4] , Bellare et al. presented two SOA security notions, the indistinguishability-based one (IND-SO) and the simulation-based one (SIM-SO). Later, Hemenway et al. [13] introduced the notions of IND-SO-CCA1/CCA2 security and SIM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 security. Over the years, several PKE schemes were proposed and proved to possess SOA security [11] [13] [12] [14] . The relations between IND-SO-CPA security and SIM-SO-CPA security were clarified by Böhl et al. [3] . Bellare et al. [2] separated IND-CPA (even IND-CCA2) and SIM-SO-CPA security. Recently, Hofheinz and Rupp [16] showed a separation between IND-CCA2 and IND-SO-CCA2 security, and a "partial" equivalence between IND-CPA and IND-SO-CPA security.
To the best of our knowledge, how to formalize non-malleability under selective opening attacks remains elusive. Very recently, Hofheinz and Rupp referred to "NM-SO-CPA security" in [16] . But they did not present any formal definition.
Our contributions. This paper focuses on security notions and their relations. We first formalize the notion of simulation-based non-malleability under selective opening attacks (SIM-NM-SO), and the notion of indistinguishability-based non-malleability under selective opening attacks (IND-NM-SO). We figure out the relations among SIM-NM-SO-CPA(/CCA1/CCA2) security, IND-NM-SO-CPA(/CCA1/CCA2) security, SIM/IND-SO-CPA(/CCA1/CCA2) security and non-malleability security SIM/IND-NM-CPA(/CCA1/CCA2). Specifically, our results are as follows (see Figure 1 ). Below, we use SEC1 ⇒ SEC2 to indicate that SEC1 implies SEC2, and SEC1 SEC2 to indicate the existence of some PKE scheme achieving SEC1 but not SEC2, for any two security notions SEC1 and SEC2. secure; Any IND-SO-CCA2 secure encryption scheme (e.g., [13] [12] ) is IND-NM-SO-CCA2 secure.
Techniques for the implications. For two main non-trivial implication results, we provide their high-level descriptions of the reasonings here.
-For our contribution 1.(a).ii., the key point is how to construct a SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 simulator S N S from a SIM-SO-CCA2 simulator S. Given S's output out S , if it is a valid message, S N S can simply generate a ciphertext by encrypting it, such that the decryption of S N S 's output equals out S . The barrier is that when out S is not a valid message, this method doesn't work. To overcome this issue, we apply the idea from [18] , assuming that there is an algorithm F recovering ciphertexts from decrypted messages. Under this assumption, S N S can use F to recover a ciphertext from out S , if out S falls into the range of decrypted messages. However, this method fails if out S does not belong to the range of the decryption algorithm Dec. This problem can be solved by assuming that the range of the decryption algorithm Dec is recognizable. With the recognizable property of Dec, SIM-SO-CCA2 security ensures that S's output out S is almost always in the range of Dec as long as the SIM-SO-CCA2 adversary's final output is in the range. -For our contribution 2.(a).i., the key point is constructing a SIM-NM-ATK simulator S N from a SIM-NM-SO-ATK simulator S N S . Note that S N S has the ability, which S N doesn't, to ask an opening query. To overcome this issue, we consider a special "half-uniform" message distribution (see Definition 9) , which consists of two independent distributions and the second is a uniform one. Correspondingly, the challenge message vector generated from this specific distribution also consists of two parts. If S N S outputs a "half-uniform" distribution and asks to open the uniform part, S N can always answer it on its own by returning a uniformly chosen message vector. However, S N still cannot deal with a misbehaved S N S which outputs other distributions or it does not open the uniform part. To solve this problem, we construct a behaved SIM-NM-SO-ATK adversary A N S , which always outputs a half-uniform distribution and asks to open the uniform part, and then SIM-NM-SO-ATK security guarantees S N S is behaved, except with negligible probability.
Observations for the separations. Some of our separation results can be seen as extensions of [1] [18] . Most of these separations are based on the following observations. Let's look at the SIM-based notions first. A SIM-NM security notion requires that the decryptions of both of the adversary's and the simulator's outputs be indistinguishable. Note that a non-NM security notion only requires that their outputs be indistinguishable. We can provide a uniformly distributed string, which leads to a special ciphertext (e.g., decrypted to sk), to the adversary through the decryption oracle. It is hard for any SIM-NM simulator to generate such a ciphertext, since it has no access to the decryption oracle. This feature can be used to separate some SIM-based NM and non-NM security notions (in a SOA or non-SOA setting). For the IND-based notions, note that even under CPA attacks, an IND-NM adversary can make a one-time parallel decryption query after receiving the challenge ciphertext. This feature can be used to separate some IND-based NM and non-NM security notions (in a SOA or non-SOA setting).
Open question.
The primary open question is to figure out the relations between SIM-NM-SO and IND-NM-SO security notions. The barriers we encounter are as follows. For NM security notions, there is always a parallel decryption process after the adversary receiving the challenge ciphertext. This fact makes the relation between these two notions (even under CPA attacks) similar to that between SIM-SO-CCA2 and IND-SO-CCA2 security. Besides that, we also need to deal with the aforementioned issue, i.e., the SIM-NM-SO simulator's output always contains a ciphertext vector.
Preliminaries
Notations. Throughout this paper, we use κ as the security parameter, and as the empty string. For n ∈ N + , let [n] denote the set {1, 2, · · · , n}. Let U n denote a uniform distribution over {0, 1} n . For a finite set S, let s ← S denote the process of sampling an element s uniformly at random from S. For a probabilistic algorithm A, let R A denote the randomness space of A. We let y ← A(x; R) denote the process of running A on input x and inner randomness R ∈ R A , and outputting y. We write y ← A(x) for y ← A(x; R) with uniformly chosen R ∈ R A . If A's running time is polynomial in κ, we say that A is a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm. For two sequences of random variables X = {X κ } κ∈N and
| is negligible in κ, we say that X and Y are computationally indistinguishable (denoted by X c ≈ Y ). We use boldface letters for vectors. For a vector m (resp. a finite set S), we let |m| (resp. |S|) denote the length of the vector (resp. the size of the set). For a set I = {i 1 
We write m ∈ m to denote m ∈ {m[i]|i ∈ [|m|]}, extending the set membership notation to vectors.
Public-key encryption. A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is a tuple of algorithms PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec). The key generation algorithm Gen takes a security parameter κ as input and outputs a public/secret key pair (pk, sk). The encryption algorithm Enc takes a public key pk and a message m as input, and outputs a ciphertext c. The decryption algorithm Dec takes a secret key sk and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs a message m or a failure symbol ⊥. For correctness, we require that for (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 κ ) and c ← Enc(pk, m), Dec(sk, c) = m with overwhelming probability.
For simplicity, we write Enc(pk, m) : Decryption oracles. For simplicity, we will use the notations O 1 (·) and O 2 (·) in all the security notions throughout the paper. In a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), both the oracles O 1 (·) and O 2 (·) always return . In a non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA1), O 1 (·) = Dec(sk, ·), and O 2 (·) still returns whatever it is queried. In an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA2), both O 1 (·) and O 2 (·) are Dec(sk, ·), with the only exception that O 2 (·) returns when queried on a ciphertext appeared in the challenge ciphertext vector.
Non-malleability for encryption. The first definition of non-malleability for encryption was proposed by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [8] [9] in 1991. Their definition is simulation-based. Several years later, comparison-based and indistinguishability-based definitions of non-malleability were proposed [1] [5] , and their relations were explored in [5] [18] . We recall the simulation/indistinguishability-based definitions in [18] as follows.
Definition 1 (SIM-NM security). A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is SIM-NM-ATK secure, if for any stateful PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), there is a stateful PPT simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ), such that
where ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, Exp Table 1 . (κ) (b ∈ {0, 1}) is defined in Table 1 , and we require that in the experiment, |m 0 | = |m 1 |, and |m
Remark 1. Note that in Definition 1 and Definition 2, we do not require that |y| = |m| or |y| = |m b |. We also note that the ciphertexts contained in y may be invalid, i.e., ⊥ ∈ x. According to [18] , these two definitions are stronger than the versions which require that y must be valid ciphertexts.
Selective opening security for encryption. Simulation-based and indistinguishability-based selective opening security notions were presented by Bellare et al. [4] in Eurocrypt 2009. We follow [4] [13] [3] for the definition.
Definition 3 (SIM-SO security [3] ). A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is SIM-SO-ATK secure, if for any stateful PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ), there is a stateful PPT simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ), such that
where ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, Exp
(κ) are defined in Table 1 . 
IND-SO experiment:
For indistinguishability-based selective opening (IND-SO) security notion, we restrict message distributions to be efficiently re-samplable. In [3] , the IND-SO security notion with this restriction is called "weak" IND-SO security, and the one without this restriction is called "full". But there is no PKE achieving full IND-SO-CPA security yet. 
where the experiment Exp Table 1. 3 Non-malleability under selective opening attack
In this section, we formalize non-malleability under selective opening attacks for PKE. We consider simulation-based and indistinguishability-based formalizations of this security, which we call SIM-NM-SO security and IND-NM-SO security, respectively.
Simulation-based selective opening non-malleability. The simulation-based notion of nonmalleability under selective opening attacks combines SIM-NM security and SIM-SO security. Informally, a SIM-NM-SO-ATK adversary is a SIM-NM-ATK adversary being allowed to make an additional selective opening query. Similarly, the related simulator is also allowed to make an opening query. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 6 (SIM-NM-SO security). A public-key encryption scheme
(κ) are defined as follows:
Indistinguishability-based selective opening non-malleability. The indistinguishabilitybased notion of non-malleability under selective opening attacks is also a combination of IND-NM security and IND-SO security. However, there are some subtleties in this combination. First, as the notion of IND-SO security, we require that every message distribution outputted by the adversary should be efficiently re-samplable. Second, in this combination, an adversary should be allowed to make two special oracle queries, a selective opening query and a parallel decryption query. In the following formal definition, we allow the adversary to decide the order of these two oracle queries. More specifically, the adversary can make these two queries at any time after receiving the vector of challenge ciphertexts, but only once for each oracle. Note that we require the adversary has to make these two oracle queries, since the "challenge bit" b is given through the opening oracle Open b,M,m 0 ,r (·). The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 7 (IND-NM-SO security).
A public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is IND-NM-SO-ATK secure, if for any stateful PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ), its advantage Adv
(κ) is negligible, where ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. Here
where the experiment Exp
(κ) (b ∈ {0, 1}) and the related oracles are defined as follows. In experiment Exp
(κ), we require that adversary A 2 access to both oracles Open b,M,m 0 ,r (·) and P sk,c (·) just once respectively.
Oracle P sk,c (y):
Remark 2. In [11] [3], the notions of traditional selective opening security were generalized to a new version, where the adversary is allowed to make multiple opening queries adaptively. SIM-NM-SO security and IND-NM-SO security can also be naturally generalized to the similar notions. In this paper, for simplicity, when we talk about selective opening attack (i.e., SIM/IND-SO security or SIM/IND-NM-SO security), we just consider the adversaries making one round of opening query. However, all the results investigated in this paper can be extended to the generalized notions.
Relations between SIM-NM-SO securities and SIM-SO securities
In this section, we explore the relations between SIM-NM-SO securities and SIM-SO securities, showing that SIM-NM-SO-ATK security is strictly stronger than SIM-SO-ATK security, for any ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}.
SIM-NM-SO-ATK ⇒ SIM-SO-ATK. We provide a high-level description of the reasoning here.
Given any SIM-SO-ATK adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) for an encryption scheme PKE, we construct a SIM-NM-SO-ATK adversary A (in Table 2 ). If Exp
. SIM-NM-SO-ATK security guarantees that there is a simulator S with respect to A , such that Exp
Based on S , we can construct a SIM-SO-ATK simulator S (in Table 2 ), such that Exp SIM-SO-ATK-Ideal PKE,S (κ) := (M S , m S , I S , σ S ). Hence, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. (SIM-NM-SO-ATK ⇒ SIM-SO-ATK).
For any ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, SIM-NM-SO-ATK security implies SIM-SO-ATK security. Table 2 . Constructions of adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) and simulator S = (S1, S2, S3)
return outS SIM-SO-ATK SIM-NM-SO-ATK. Now we show that SIM-SO security is strictly weaker than SIM-NM-SO-ATK security. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 2. (SIM-SO-ATK
SIM-NM-SO-ATK). For any ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, there is a SIM-SO-ATK secure PKE scheme, which is not SIM-NM-SO-ATK secure.
We prove this theorem with two counterexamples. In the case of ATK = CPA, we consider the Goldwasser-Micali probabilistic encryption scheme (the GM scheme) [10] . In [4] , Bellare et al. pointed out that the GM scheme is SIM-SO-CPA secure. We claim that the GM scheme is not SIM-NM-SO-CPA secure because of its homomorphic property. Roughly speaking, let the challenge ciphertext vector c be generated from a random message vector m. We can construct an adversary A who encrypts bit 0 to obtain a ciphertext y , and then outputs y :
However, no PPT simulator S can output a ciphertext vector y satisfying x = m, since m was uniformly chosen and no information about m is leaked to S except the opened messages.
In the case of ATK ∈ {CCA1, CCA2}, we show a counterexample as follows. The main idea of our counterexample is similar to that in [18] . Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme. We construct a new scheme PKE = ( Gen, Enc, Dec):
To prove that PKE is not SIM-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 secure, consider the adversary A: A obtains θ by querying the decryption oracle on input (c, 0, 1 κ ), and outputs a ciphertext whose decryption is ⊥. Notice that any PPT simulator S has no information about the uniformly chosen θ, since it cannot access to the decryption oracle. So the probability that the simulator outputs a ciphertext whose decryption is ⊥ is negligible. Consider the distin-
(κ). Hence, PKE is not SIM-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 secure. Now, what remains is to prove the SIM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 security of PKE, which is guaranteed by PKE's SIM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 security. The formal proof will be given in Appendix A. Remark 3. The aforementioned analysis actually shows that PKE is not SIM-NM-SO-CCA1 secure, even if PKE is SIM-SO-CCA2 secure. So we have a stronger conclusion: "SIM-SO-CCA2 SIM-NM-SO-CCA1", and a similar analysis gives "SIM-SO-CCA2 SIM-NM-CCA1". Remark 4. Since SIM-SO-CPA security implies IND-SO-CPA security, the GM scheme is also IND-SO-CPA secure. Due to the same reason, we will find that the GM scheme is not IND-NM-SO-CPA secure. In other words, the GM scheme is an example which is SIM/IND-SO-CPA A note on SIM-NM-SO-CCA2. In [18] , Pass et al. specified a special condition (i.e., the message space and the range of the decryption algorithm are identical), under which IND-NM-CCA1/CCA2 security and SIM-NM-CCA1/CCA2 security are equivalent. Interestingly, we find that under this condition, if the range of the decryption algorithm is recognizable (i.e., roughly speaking, there is a polynomial-time algorithm, which can determine whether an element is in the range of the decryption algorithm), then SIM-SO-CCA2 security implies SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 security (i.e., these two security notions are equivalent).
Below we recall the special condition proposed in [18] , which we name "invertible decryption".
Definition 8 (Invertible decryption).
Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a PKE scheme. Dec is invertible if there exists a PPT algorithm F, such that for any ciphertext c, Dec(sk, F(pk, Dec(sk, c))) = Dec(sk, c), where (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 κ ).
Theorem 3. If a SIM-SO-CCA2 secure PKE scheme has an invertible decryption algorithm, and the range of the decryption algorithm is recognizable in polynomial time, then the scheme is also SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 secure.
Proof. Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a SIM-SO-CCA2 secure encryption scheme, such that it has an inverting algorithm F, and the range of Dec is recognizable. Now we prove PKE is SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 secure. For any PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) attacking PKE in the sense of SIM-NM-SO-CCA2, we construct a PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) attacking PKE in the sense of SIM-SO-CCA2 as follows.
Receiving a public key pk, A 1 runs A 1 on the input of pk. For any decryption query c asked by A 1 , A 1 sends c to its own decryption oracle, and then returns the answer to A 1 . At some point, A 1 returns a message distribution M. Then, A 1 outputs M to the challenger.
On the other side, the challenger samples m ← M and r ← (R Enc ) |m| , and generates c * ← Enc(pk, m; r).
Receiving c * from the challenger, A 2 runs A 2 on the input of c * . For any decryption query c asked by A 2 , A 2 answers with its own decryption oracle as before (of course, both A 2 and A 2 are not allowed to query c ∈ c * ). At some point, Since PKE is SIM-SO-CCA2 secure, there is a PPT simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) such that
Now, based on S , we construct a simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ) in the sense of SIM-NM-SO-CCA2.
Receiving a public key pk, S 1 runs S 1 on the input of 1 κ . Then S 1 outputs the M S returned by S 1 .
On the other side, the challenger samples m S ← M S , without returning anything to S. Later, S 2 outputs a subset I S . That is the description of simulator S. Let bad denote the event that S aborts. If bad does not occur, then for any j ∈ [|x S |] such that x S [j] = COPY, there is some ciphertext c j (not has to be valid), such that Dec(sk, c j ) = x S [j]. We have Dec(sk, y S [j]) = Dec(sk, F(pk, Dec(sk, c j ))) = Dec(sk, c j ) = x S [j]. In this case,
So for any PPT algorithm D,
Notice that if Pr[bad] is negligible, then we have
Combining equations (1), (2) and (3) gives 
Relations between IND-NM-SO securities and IND-SO securities
In this section, we explore the relations between IND-NM-SO securities and IND-SO securities. First of all, for any ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, an IND-NM-SO-ATK adversary is more powerful than an IND-SO-ATK adversary in that it can make an additional query to oracle P sk (·). Intuitively, IND-NM-SO-ATK security implies IND-SO-ATK security. Further more, any IND-SO-CCA2 adversary A is able to access to the decryption oracle after receiving the challenge ciphertext vector. So providing A the ability to make a parallel decryption query yields no additional power. The above analysis results in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. (IND-NM-SO-ATK ⇒ IND-SO-ATK, IND-NM-SO-CCA2 ⇔ IND-SO-CCA2).
For any ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, IND-NM-SO-ATK security implies IND-SO-ATK security. Further more, if ATK = CCA2, these two securities are equivalent.
IND-NM-SO-CPA
IND-SO-CCA1. Formally, we have the following theorem. This is an direct extension of the conclusion in [1] . So we just provide a high-level description of the reasoning here.
Theorem 5. (IND-NM-SO-CPA IND-SO-CCA1).
There is an IND-SO-CCA1 secure PKE scheme, which is not IND-NM-SO-CPA secure; vice verse.
The direction . Note that after receiving the challenge ciphertext, the IND-SO-CCA1 adversary cannot access to the decryption oracle, but the IND-NM-SO-CPA adversary still can make a parallel decryption query. Based on this observation, any PKE scheme, achieving IND-SO-CCA1 but not IND-SO-CCA2 security, might be used as a counterexample. The following scheme PKE , with message space {0, 1} κ , is from [1] . If the basic scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is IND-SO-CCA1 secure, then we can prove that PKE is IND-SO-CCA1 secure but not IND-NM-SO-CPA secure. The formal proof is in Appendix B. The direction . Note that an IND-NM-SO-CPA adversary can make just a one-time decryption query (although it is parallel), but an IND-SO-CCA1 adversary can query the decryption oracle polynomial times. Based on this observation, we provide a PKE scheme PKE , which is identical to the scheme PKE in Section 4, except that during the decryption, roughly, the decryption algorithm returns the original secret key sk instead of the special symbol ⊥, in the case of "b = 0 and ϑ = θ". The analysis is similar to that in Section 4. The IND-SO-CCA1 Table 4 . PKE = (Gen , Enc , Dec ) 
Relations between SIM-NM-SO securities and SIM-NM securities
SIM-NM-SO-ATK ⇒ SIM-NM-ATK. Compared with the conclusion that "SIM-NM-SO-ATK ⇒ SIM-SO-ATK", this conclusion is not that obvious. That is because, compared with the SIM-NM-SO-ATK adversary, although the SIM-NM-ATK adversary is less powerful (i.e., not allowed to make any opening query), the corresponding simulator also has less information (i.e., not allowed to make any opening query) about the message vector. Formally, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6. (SIM-NM-SO-ATK ⇒ SIM-NM-ATK).
For any ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}, SIM-NM-SO-ATK security implies SIM-NM-ATK security.
For convenience, we firstly define a special message distribution, and then turn to the formal proof.
Definition 9 ((n 1 , n 2 )-half-uniform distribution). A distribution M is (n 1 , n 2 )-half-uniform, if it satisfies the following three properties: (1)For any m ← M, |m| = 2n 1 ; (2)M = M A ||(U n 2 ) n 1 , where M A is independent of (U n 2 ) n 1 ; (3)The description of M consists of two descriptions (i.e., M A and (U n 2 ) n 1 ).
Remark 6. In Table 1 , every "M" returned by A 1 or S 1 actually stands for the description of message distribution M. The above property (3) requires that receiving a description of an (n 1 , n 2 )-half-uniform distribution M, any one can efficiently extract the description of the related distribution M A .
Proof. We prove that "SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 security ⇒ SIM-NM-CCA2 security". The proof in the case of CPA/CCA1 is similar, which we will omit here.
Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 secure encryption scheme. For any PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) attacking PKE in the sense of SIM-NM-CCA2, we construct a PPT adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) attacking PKE in the sense of SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 as follows.
Receiving a public key pk, A 1 runs A 1 on the input of pk. For any decryption query c asked by A 1 , A 1 sends c to its own decryption oracle, and then returns the answer to A 1 . At some point, A 1 returns a message distribution M A . Without loss of generality, we assume that all the message vectors sampled from M A have the same size (denoted by n 1 ), i.e., for any m A ← M A , |m A | = n 1 . Then, A 1 outputs M A := M A ||(U n 2 ) n 1 , where n 2 is also an integer polynomial in κ.
On the other side, the challenger chooses m A ← M A (i.e., samples m A ← M A , m U ← (U n 2 ) n 1 , and sets m A := m A ||m U ) and r ← (R Enc ) 2n 1 , and generates c * ← Enc(pk, m A ; r).
Upon receiving c * from the challenger, A 2 outputs I A := {n 1 + 1, n 1 + 2, · · · , 2n 1 } as its opening query.
Receiving 
It is easy for A 3 to generate such a y [i], since PKE is a probabilistic encryption scheme achieving SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 security.
A 3 returns (y , σ) as its final output.
That is the description of adversary A . Note that A perfectly simulates the real experiment Exp
(κ) for A, and the decryptions of y and y are identical (denoted by x). We have that
and Exp
Since PKE is SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 secure, there is a PPT simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ), such that Exp
Now, based on S , we show a simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) in the sense of SIM-NM-CCA2. Receiving a public key pk, S 1 obtains a message distribution M S by running S 1 on the input of pk. After receiving an opening query I S from S 2 , S 1 runs as follows: If M S is not (n 1 , n 2 )-half-uniform (for some n 1 , n 2 that are both polynomial in κ), or I S = {n 1 + 1, n 1 + 2, · · · , 2n 1 } for the n 1 determined by M S , then S aborts (with S 1 outputting M S = U n 3 for some integer n 3 , and S 2 outputting randomly chosen (y U , σ U )); Otherwise, S 1 parses M S = M S ||(U n 2 ) n 1 , and outputs M S to the challenger.
On the other side, the challenger samples m S ← M S , without returning anything to S. S 2 samples m U ← (U n 2 ) n 1 , and runs S 3 on the input of m U . Finally, S 2 outputs S 3 's final output (y S , σ S ).
That is the description of simulator S.
Let bad denote the event that S aborts, and x S denote the decryption of y S . Then, when bad does not occur, both of the following equations hold,
Hence, for any PPT distinguisher D, we denote its advantage by
To bound the inequality, we present the following two lemmas and postpone their proofs.
Lemma 2. Pr[bad] is negligible.
Hence, Adv D is negligible. So we conclude that
So what remains is to prove Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Proof. (of Lemma 1)
Based on the aforementioned D, we show an algorithm D , distinguishing Exp Table 5 . Combining equations (4), (5), (7) and (8), it is not hard to see that D has the following properties: (6) guarantees that Adv D is negligible. So we finish the proof of Lemma 1. 
If M is not (n1, n2)-half-uniform (for some n1, n2 that are both polynomial in κ), return 0 that are both polynomial in κ), return 1 If I = {n1 + 1, n1 + 2, · · · , 2n1} for the n1 determIf I = {n1 + 1, n1 + 2, · · · , 2n1} for the n1 determined by M S , return 0 ined by M S , return 1
Proof. (of Lemma 2) Note that bad occurs if and only if M S is not an (n 1 , n 2 )-half-uniform distribution, or I S = {n 1 + 1, n 1 + 2, · · · , 2n 1 } for the n 1 determined by M S . Hence, whether bad occurs can be check in polynomial time. Consider the PPT algorithm D described in Table 5 .
From equation (4), it is easy to see that Pr[D (Exp
Therefore, equation (6) guarantees that Pr[bad] is negligible.
Remark 7. We can also prove Theorem 6 by simply constructing a "non-opening" SIM-NM-SO-ATK adversary, which is a copy of the SIM-NM-ATK adversary, and using the related SIM-NM-SO-ATK simulator as the SIM-NM-ATK simulator. Hence, our aforementioned proof actually shows that even considering constrained SIM-NM-SO-ATK adversary (i.e., "opening" adversary), Theorem 6 still holds. We note that all the simulation-based security notions (e.g., SIM-SO-ATK security) in this paper are described as "Exp
(κ)", free of "relation R". For formal definitions of SIM-NM-ATK security (resp. SIM-SO-ATK security) defined with "relation R", we refer the readers to the papers [5] (resp. [4] ). We note that if considering the simulation-based security notions described with "relation R", the conclusion of Theorem 6 might need to be reconsidered.
SIM-NM-ATK
SIM-NM-SO-ATK. We will show that the IND-CCA2 secure CramerShoup scheme [6] [7] (the CS scheme) is SIM-NM-CCA2 secure. But the CS scheme is not SIM-SO-CPA secure [2] . According to Theorem 1, it is not SIM-NM-SO-CPA secure either. Consequently, "SIM-NM-ATK SIM-NM-SO-ATK ", for any ATK , ATK ∈ {CPA, CCA1, CCA2}. To show that the CS scheme is SIM-NM-CCA2 secure, we use the following two facts: (1) For any PKE scheme having an invertible decryption algorithm, it is IND-NM-CCA2 secure iff it is SIM-NM-CCA2 secure [18, Theorem 6] . (2) IND-CCA2 security is equivalent to IND-NM-CCA2 security, since the parallel decryption query provides no additional ability to the adversary in the case of CCA2. So what remains is to show that the CS scheme has an invertible decryption algorithm. Let (Enc, Dec) denote the corresponding encryption/decryption algorithms. Following the notations of [7] , any valid ciphertext ψ of the CS scheme has the form ψ := (a,â, c, d) ∈ G 4 , the message space is G, and the range of Dec is G {reject}, where G is a group of prime order q (see [7] ). We construct an inverting algorithm F as follows: On input (pk, Dec(sk, ψ)), if Dec(sk, ψ) ∈ G, then F runs Enc(pk, Dec(sk, ψ)) and returns the generated ciphertext; If Dec(sk, ψ) = reject, then F returns an arbitrary ciphertext not in G 4 .
Relations between IND-NM-SO securities and IND-NM securities
In this section, we explore the relations between IND-NM-SO securities and IND-NM securities. Our conclusions are as follows.
Theorem 7. (IND-NM-CCA2
IND-NM-SO-CCA2). There is an IND-NM-CCA2 secure PKE scheme, which is not IND-NM-SO-CCA2 secure. Notice that IND-NM-CCA2 (resp. IND-NM-SO-CCA2) security is equivalent to IND-CCA2 (resp. IND-SO-CCA2) security, so Theorem 7 is directly from [16] , which separated IND-CCA2 security and IND-SO-CCA2 security.
The conclusion of Theorem 8 is not surprising at all. Intuitively, compared with the adversary considered in the notion of IND-NM security, the one considered in the notion of IND-NM-SO security is similar but more powerful. One subtlety here is that the ways that message vectors are sampled in these two notions are different. Due to space limitations, we provide the proof of this theorem in Appendix C. Remark 8. In Section 5, we have showed that "IND-NM-SO-CPA IND-SO-CCA1" by utilizing scheme PKE as a counterexample. With a similar analysis, it is easy to see that PKE is not IND-NM-CCA1 secure. So we conclude that "IND-NM-SO-CPA IND-NM-CCA1".
Relations between SIM-NM-SO securities and IND-NM-SO securities
In this section, we explore the relations between SIM-NM-SO securities and IND-NM-SO securities. Formally, we have the following conclusion. Its proof is similar to that of Theorem 2 and [18, Theorem 4], so we just provide a sketch here.
Theorem 9. (IND-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2
SIM-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2). For any ATK ∈ {CCA1, CCA2}, there is an IND-NM-SO-ATK secure PKE scheme, which is not SIM-NM-SO-ATK secure.
Proof. (Sketch) Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an IND-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 secure encryption scheme. We construct the scheme PKE = ( Gen, Enc, Dec) described in Table 3 . Note that in Section 4, we have shown that PKE is not SIM-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 secure, and the reasoning there does not involve the security of the basic scheme PKE. So here we just need to prove that PKE achieves IND-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 security.
For any PPT adversary A attacking PKE in the sense of IND-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 with nonnegligible advantage, roughly speaking, we construct a PPT adversary A attacking PKE (in the sense of IND-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2) as follows: Receiving the public key, A chooses θ ← {0, 1} κ , and uses this θ and its own decryption oracle to answer A's decryption queries. A outputs the same message distribution M as A does, transforms any component c[i] of its own challenge ciphertext vector into (c[i], 1, 0 κ ) to get a modified challenge ciphertext vector and passes the modified one to A. A uses its own opening oracle to answer A's opening query. Finally, A returns A's final output. Notice that A perfectly simulates the IND-NM-SO-CCA1/CCA2 experiment (about PKE) for A. So A's advantage is also non-negligible, contradicting the assumption.
Remark 9. Note that PKE is not SIM-NM-SO-CCA1 secure, even if PKE is IND-NM-SO-CCA2 secure. So we actually have a stronger conclusion: "IND-NM-SO-CCA2 SIM-NM-SO-CCA1".
Constructions
Fortunately, there are some known selective opening secure PKE schemes achieving SIM/IND-NM-SO securities. Details are as follows.
SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 secure construction. The Fehr-Hofheinz-Kiltz-Wee encryption scheme (the FHKW scheme) is SIM-SO-CCA2 secure [11] [14] [15] . We claim that the decryption algorithm of the FHKW scheme is invertible, and the range of the decryption algorithm is recognizable. Hence, according to Theorem 3, the FHKW scheme is SIM-NM-SO-CCA2 secure. Our claim is justified as follows. According to [11] , any valid ciphertext of the FHKW scheme has the form (X 1 , · · · , X L , T ), and the message space is {0, 1} L . For any ciphertext of the form (X 1 , · · · , X L , T ), where X i ∈ X and T ∈ X T , its decryption is an L-bit string. Since X and X T are both efficiently recognizable, any invalid ciphertext (X 1 , · · · , X L , T ) (i.e., X i / ∈ X for some i, or T / ∈ X T ) will be decrypted to ⊥. In other words, the range of the decryption algorithm is {0, 1} L {⊥}, which is recognizable. As to the special inverting algorithm F, we construct it as follows: Let (Enc, Dec) denote the encryption/decryption algorithms of the FHKW scheme. For any ciphertext c, we have that Dec(sk, c) ∈ {0, 1} L {⊥}. If Dec(sk, c) ∈ {0, 1} L , F runs Enc(pk, Dec(sk, c)) and returns the generated ciphertext; If Dec(sk, c) = ⊥, F returns an arbitrary ciphertext (X 1 , · · · , X L , T ) where That is the description of adversary A. 
It is obvious that
Since PKE is SIM-SO-CCA2 secure, there is a simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 , S 3 ), such that 
Note that in the sense of SIM-SO-CCA2, a simulator does not receive any public key or ciphertext, and is not allowed to ask any decryption query either. Hence, simulator S in the ideal experiment for PKE can be used as a simulator in the ideal experiment for PKE. Therefore, setting S := S, we have that 
Combining equations (9), (10) and (11), we have that Therefore, PKE is SIM-SO-CCA2 secure. However, for any PPT simulator S, in the ideal experiment Exp SIM-NM-SO-CCA2-Ideal PKE,S (κ) S can not access to the decryption oracle, which means that S has no information about θ. So the probability that S outputs a ciphertext whose decryption is ⊥ is 
